Stalin is Staggered. Chapter One: Confused by Reality
Hitler put a massive army on Russia's western border and then pretended that peace was his only desire. Stalin knew he wasn't strong enough to withstand it, so he chose to believe Hitler's deception.
This Episode: In early 1941 Adolf Hitler had England reeling from his Luftwaffe bombs, but still strangely resilient. One year earlier he expected their surrender to come quickly. As it hadn’t, he didn’t know whether the drunken Churchill or his own morphine-addicted Göring was more to blame, but now their cause was truly hopeless as his U-Boat strangulation of their supplies shipped from America was bringing them to poverty and starvation. Roosevelt’s Lend Lease policy, and now his declaration of an “unlimited national emergency” got his attention. His American sources assured him that the nation had an empty arsenal and an isolationist population. If — no, when! — he killed Stalin and conquered Russia, America would lose interest in helping Britain. That was his current intention.
This Chapter: Stalin had so much contradictory information about Hitler’s intentions from so many suspicious sources that he chose to believe himself most of all. The problem with that, though he didn’t know it, was that as he had built his immense power on blind bullying of his people, and had little experience in internationalism, he was bad at understanding people he couldn’t dominate. Hitler had assembled an army of three million Nazi soldiers on his western border of a thousand miles. The Führer had taken his time in doing it, so a surprise attack was impossible. This was how he had taken Austria and Czechoslovakia without a shot being fired, so Stalin thought this was just another bluff in pursuit of doing good business.
Contents of “Stalin is Staggered”:
Confused by Reality
The Last Day Before War
Churchill, Defiant and Resolute, Links with Stalin
Chapter One: Confused by Reality
Reading time Eighteen minutes
Joseph Stalin’s control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was so absolute that disagreeing with him carried the possibility of torture on charges of treason, and execution for its compelled confession. He had reason for his iron belief in himself from all he had achieved for his nation, but the paranoia that drove his murderous purges and the isolation of his authority left him deficient in the complexities of divining the intentions of others on the global stage.
Since the year of 1941 opened, he had faced fourteen predictions of the date of Hitler’s attack on the USSR. The most credible date had been May 14. It had logic, endurance, and documentation. But when Hitler diverted his army to the overdone annihilation of Yugoslavia and the conquest of Greece, May 14 became logistically impossible. Stalin couldn’t believe Hitler had sacrificed a month of the good weather he would need in a war on Russia over a Yugoslavian tantrum. But he had.
By early June the window for invasion was surely closing if Russia could hold out until winter came, and so Stalin had come to believe that the German army on his western border was there for blackmail and not all-out war. This theory, fed by German deceptions, said the Führer’s ambitions included unrestricted access to Ukraine’s wheat and the oil of the Caucasus at Baku on the Caspian Sea. Perhaps, so the theory went, his demands might also require Russian submarines leaving the Black Sea to join him in the Atlantic war on England, plus unimpeded transit through Russian territory to engage the British in the Near East and India. Stalin thought he could confront those demands with demands of his own and wrestle the issues down to a bargain he could accept until his army was strong enough to stop Hitler in a full war, a status he expected to attain by early 1942. In his view, if he could get the Führer to negotiate, the time of wrangling alone would close the year’s invasion window even if nothing came of the dealmaking.
The two countries were still in the formal alliance of 1939 and Stalin had shown himself open to doing business. He was meeting the terms of his contract for delivery of wheat and oil, and Germany was fulfilling its end of the bargain by supplying him with the advanced machinery tools he needed to build an advanced war machine. He didn’t realize that Göring, who was Germany’s economics czar, had decided to continue sending his machine tools because the war would open, and close, before Stalin could make use of them, and Germany would seize them as war booty. Stalin continued his imaginary courtship with the supportive step of closing the embassies and terminating diplomatic relations with Hitler’s conquered countries — Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia. He even extended the gratuitous gesture of permitting German officials to tour his weapons factories, where he expected they would be stunned into reconsideration of attack by his emerging armament. He had a 1,000-horsepower aircraft engine coming on line, and a new tank, the T-34, that had no peer in armor, maneuverability, and cannons. What Hitler’s men saw, however, was that while Stalin had 10,000 tanks, fewer than a thousand of them were T-34s, and the ones that were not could not withstand the shells they would receive. They saw that only one-fourth of his 9,000 planes were as good as Germany’s least. Yet those that were as good, they also saw, were even better, and getting better every day.
Stalin could put more men in uniform than Hitler, but they would arrive at battle utterly untrained, suitable only for dying for Mother Russia, which of itself didn’t trouble Stalin, but their dying in a losing cause would gain him nothing. Thanks to his purges, eighty-five percent of his 659,000 officers were under the age of thirty-five and only one percent were older than forty-five. Half the young officers had limited military training of their own, having been subsumed into the army from peasantry and the bureaucracy. The USSR was now spending forty percent of its budget on preparing for war. They weren’t ready for it in 1941, but they would be next year, and Hitler knew it.
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Seventeen thousand trains had delivered the Nazi army that was arrayed on the Russian border in June. It included 3,600 tanks, 600,000 motorized vehicles, many armored, 7,000 artillery pieces, 2,500 airplanes, 625,000 horses, and three million battle-hardened infantrymen. And there were reserves. While Stalin had the numerical edge in tanks, artillery pieces, planes, and soldiers, his advantage was in quantity and not quality. More, the Russians’ two recent forays into battle, Poland and Finland, had been small scale and their performances unimpressive. And the deployment of Stalin’s forces against the German war machine that had gathered on the border was confused and uncertain.
The surviving Russian generals explored and wargamed three doctrines of defense and counterattack should the full assault come. “Defense in Depth” permitted the invading army to penetrate the front line and advance quickly. Ground would be given in such a way that the invader’s links with their supporting forces and supply lines would be weakened. Soon the main assault would meet a stronger defensive line that would slow them as flanking forces encircled the line of attack and cut it in two. “Mobile Defense,” a modification of Defense in Depth, presented the invaders with myriad flanking maneuvers responding with speed to battlefield intelligence gleaned from reconnaissance flights and directed by radio communications. The third, “Forward Defense,” gave no ground at the point of attack and flanked it immediately with reserves in counteroffensives.
Each of these tactical defenses presumed a massive thrust, but not the three massive thrusts that they seemed to be facing, an attack that resembled a wave with a width of a thousand miles. More, the Red Army that would be brought to these defenses was presumed to have three hundred fully equipped divisions, including sixty tank divisions, and nine million troops, but it did not. Those numbers would not be available until 1942. Stalin’s generals were handcuffed by not only that, but by the dictator’s insistence that his army would always be a machine of unrelenting offense. Of the three plans, Forward Defense was Stalin’s choice. Many of the purged generals had been shot for proposing anything to the contrary, but those who were left were certain that if war came now, containment — Defense in Depth — was the sensible way to proceed. Stalin got his way.
The attitude of aggression that Stalin insisted on from his generals was not shown to Hitler. Russian airspace had been penetrated by two hundred incidents of German reconnaissance flights, many of which had been forced down to reveal cameras, maps, and photos of bridges and rail lines, but Russian protests were mild and conciliatory. A German transport plane, carrying next to nothing, had “accidentally” flown the 650 miles from the border to Moscow’s Tushino Aerodrome where its pilots apologized. It was politely refueled and allowed to depart.
Zhukov and Timoshenko, Stalin’s top generals, came to him with a plan for preëmption. It would drive through Rumania, where Antonescu had assembled an army that would be helpful to Hitler but powerless to a massive, surprise Russian assault. The plan called for destroying Antonescu’s forces and driving north in a 450-mile encirclement of the German forces gathering on the border. It said, “Considering that at the present time the German army is mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the capability to beat us to the punch with a surprise attack. Therefore, we recommend that we not leave the initiative to the German command, but forestall the enemy in deployment and attack the German army while it is still in the deployment stage and has not yet had time to organize the front and the coordination among the service branches.”
Stalin said, “What? Have you lost your minds? You want to attack the Germans? If we do that, Churchill will make peace with Hitler and join them in a war against us. The United States may even join with them.” He didn’t want to attack and he didn’t want to defend. He wanted to wait, to be allowed to wait.
The wars Hitler fought since he set out to conquer provided inconclusive proof of invincibility, yet his army had that aura. Poland was nothing; the Poles fought on horseback. Denmark and Norway were overmatched, and the Norwegians could argue that they still weren’t conquered. The Dutch fought hard against ridiculous numerical superiority, and Luxembourg was … Luxembourg. The Belgian army had far more grit and resilience than their commander-in-chief, the fainthearted king. France also suffered from cowardice at the top, though the people wanted no part either. Still, French troops often showed courage despite spending six weeks getting placed in indefensible positions. Greece and Yugoslavia were hardly fair game. And Britain had shown itself to be a very tough chew.
And yet it was widely agreed that a Nazi assault on Russia — vast and historically unconquerable — would be a simple matter, surely over in weeks, or a month or two, tops. The Führer expected it would take four months. If he thought five months and said so, his military may have made arrangements for bracing their equipment and their troops for a Russian November. But four months was his expectation, and Göring, Goebbels, Bormann, Himmler, and many others who wouldn’t actually be in the fight thought he was being conservative. Brauchitsch, who would lead the army, and Bock, Leeb, and Rundstedt, the Field Marshals of the three prongs of the invasion, had doubts not merely of the duration, but of the outcome. But they couldn’t risk the Führer’s wrath by suggesting that someone should prepare for the need for warmer uniforms.
Hitler created confusion about his intentions. He met with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on June 2nd and took the Duce into his confidence on an array of troubling issues, but spoke warmly about Russia. He expected the thrust of the meeting’s topics would leak to the Italian press, and then beyond. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, spoke of a “cordial new day” in Axis-Soviet harmony. He said preparations were underway in Berlin in anticipation of a state visit that would recommit the two nations to peace. Mussolini hoped he would be invited.
Broad hints of a German invasion of England were dropped by Goebbels’ network, and the Führer sent fourteen divisions, four armored, to France to make it credible. Goebbels wrote in his diary, “The rumors we spread about an invasion of England are working. The newspaper ‘plants’ make it such that those abroad cannot figure out where is the truth and where is the lie. That is the atmosphere that we need. As for Russia, we were able to organize a vast flow of false information.”
A rumor took wing on the report of Stalin’s favorite spy Berlings — “Lycée-ist” to him, but “Peter” to the Germans who owned him — that the Führer intended an occupation of only western Russia leaving the huge interior to Russian management using the Vichy France model with a new “capital” in Sverdlovsk. “Sverdlovsk Soviet” it would be called. Lycée-ist’s report said, “War between Germany and Russia is unlikely. It would be very popular in Germany at a time when the war with England is not approved by the populace. However, Hitler cannot take such a risk as a war with the USSR while the British issue remains undone, fearing a breach in the unity of the Nazi Party. Hitler expects Stalin to become much more accommodating and end all the intrigues, and above all to grant Hitler more goods, especially oil.
“Should that fail, the German war plan has been worked out in the greatest detail. The maximum duration of the war is six weeks. During that time, Germany would conquer almost the entire European part of the USSR, but a new government in Sverdlovsk would not be touched. If, after that, Stalin would desire to save the socialist system, Hitler would not interfere. Nevertheless, the Führer prefers an accommodation with the USSR so that he can settle the British issue first.”
The report piled one contradiction upon another, but Stalin saw within it a central and comforting truth that Hitler wanted wheat and oil more than he wanted war. No, he didn’t. He wanted wheat, oil, and war.
The Americans had a plant of their own in Berlin whose report revealed the totality of Hitler’s plans down to the detail for replacing the Russian currency, and they took the information to Stalin’s ambassador Oumansky in Washington. But he scoffed, took the information to the German embassy to score points for collegiality, and said, “The information passed to the Soviet Union in London and Washington is aimed at provoking a conflict between Germany and the USSR.” There was a kernel of truth to that. America and Britain weren’t provoking a war — they had no expectation of bringing on a war with spy reports — but they were currying favor with Stalin should one erupt. But Stalin, in his misguided naiveté and his lifelong contempt for the capitalist democracies, had more suspicion of America and Britain than he had for the enemy that was mobilized at his border.
On June 5th, Goebbels told the Nazi press, “The Führer has decided that the war cannot be brought to an end without an invasion of Britain. Operations planned in the East have therefore been canceled. The invasion of Britain will begin in three weeks, or perhaps five.” Göring told his British contacts that he had personally drawn up a list of demands to be presented to the Soviets that included a ninety-nine year lease on Ukraine, all for the purpose of freeing the German army for an attack on Britain.
On the 10th of June, the German High Command issued the order to prepare for an assault that would begin on Sunday, June 22 at 3:30 a.m. Berlin time, one hour earlier than Moscow. It said a signal would be issued on the 21st at 13:00 Berlin time that would decree either attack or delay.
Churchill brought his Moscow ambassador Stafford Cripps to London. Cripps had long believed and said that Hitler wanted to negotiate. In Berlin, Ribbentrop raised with the Führer the prospect that the Cripps trip foretold an agreement with the Soviets. Hitler didn’t care. His only concern was having to deal with a last-minute grandiose peace gesture from Stalin. That would jeopardize the unity in his party just as he was launching the attack. But Cripps’s trip was to show him the Enigma decryptions that made it clear to Churchill that war was coming to Russia. The ambassador agreed with Churchill and met with the Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky to share his new information.
Maisky had managed by the power of his personality to thrive in London since 1932. He learned and emulated the British ways while magically holding Stalin’s trust. His cable to the Kremlin demonstrated his connections to British information in its fullness, while the last sentence showed his understanding of how to stay in Stalin’s good graces. It read, “Hitler cannot embark on the final and decisive attack against Britain before the potential threat to Germany from the East is eliminated. He believes the Red Army is a powerful force and by 1942, when all the shortcomings revealed by the Finnish campaign have been eradicated, it will be too late for the Germans to attack the Soviet Union. Cripps and Churchill are in possession of what they consider to be absolutely reliable information that Hitler will strike without warning because he is not interested in negotiating for food or raw materials. He wants only the complete destruction of the Soviet Union and the annihilation of the Red Army. But I personally do not believe Hitler will invade.”
Berlings, acting as “Peter,” told Ribbentrop that the Soviet TASS correspondent in Berlin was tasked with “clarifying whether or not Germany is actively pursuing peace negotiations with England and whether or not to expect an attempt in the longer term to secure a compromise with the United States. And to convey the Russian position that it is still possible to maintain peace through coöperation.” Stalin authorized a TASS bulletin on the 13th that said, “Germany is also, just as consistently as the USSR, observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. In view of this, according to Soviet circles, rumors of Germany’s intent to break the Pact and attack the USSR are utterly groundless. Germany has not presented any demands to the USSR and, therefore, negotiations are not taking place and rumors of a German attack are an obvious absurdity.” That day, Berlin’s Anhalter Station was decorated with a large Red Star and Soviet banners, and the Hotel Adlon was draped with Russian flags, though no one would say why. Ribbentrop did not acknowledge Stalin’s TASS bulletin and Goebbels did not publish or announce it.
On the 14th Hitler assembled his generals at the Reich Chancellery, having them arrive at staggered times and by different entrances to disguise the conference. He told them the purpose of the war was twofold. It would, upon its success, provide England with no choice but surrender, and of equal importance it would “assure once and for all the destruction of Bolshevism and European Jewry.” To that end, he reminded them that Himmler and Heydrich had four task forces — Einsatzgruppen — who would support the “brutal elimination of all Jews and Bolshevik commissars, but the soldiers of the army must themselves participate with a ferocity of extermination that our enemies have not heretofore experienced.”
Ribbentrop ordered that under secrecy the women and children of the diplomatic corps of the Moscow embassy were to be returned to Germany, and all vital documents burned. All the scurrying about and the smoke emerging from the embassy on a summer day gave it away. He also informed the embassies in Rome, Budapest, and Tokyo, “It is the German intention to introduce complete clarity in German-Soviet relations at meetings in early July and at that time to put forth certain demands.” Stalin heard.
Timoshenko and Zhukov requested authorization to have frontline Red Army troops brought to a war footing. Stalin refused, but did order the second line of defense brought up to within ten miles of the frontier under the pretext of military exercises. He told his generals to arrange their forces in positions that would enable the massive Forward Defense with counterattack potential, but not to prepare for an immediate attack and under no circumstances take any action that could be interpreted as provocative. Timoshenko and Zhukov thought this was militarily suicidal, and likely to be seen as provocative in itself, but said nothing.
On Monday, the 16th, Pavel Fitin, the 33-year-old head of NKGB Civilian Espionage who was responsible for the recruitment of Berlings, received reports from three of his other spies in Berlin that converted his view to the certainty of attack on the 22nd. Fitin’s summary read, “All military measures by Germany in preparation for an invasion that will attempt to wipe the concept of the Soviet Union from the geographical map have been utterly completed. It will open on the morning of 22 June with bombing attacks on Moscow aircraft factories.” Fitin feared the danger of passing it on to Stalin, but feared not passing it on even more, so he presented it as the conclusion of three trusted spies. Stalin said it was impossible for the Luftwaffe to make the 1,300-mile round trip of such an attack. That was true. The spies got that part wrong. He threw Fitin out of his office and ordered the three spies shot on sight. Once more, Stalin found justification for what he wanted to believe and ignored the larger truth, while no one in his presence dared to disagree with him.
Stalin’s pathology had convinced him that he was facing the two threats of a British-American plot to entangle him in a war with Germany, and Hitler’s intimidation at the border to produce a negotiating advantage. He was wrong on both counts, and had made his position doubly more dangerous by permitting the Germans to see his current military vulnerability of an inadequate army asleep on the border in Forward Defense positions, and at the same time show the enormous strength he would have in one more year. His final self-deception was shared with many others throughout the world. He, and they, did not believe Hitler would engage in a two-front war, but in Hitler’s mind a front was where soldiers fought. The war against Britain required no soldiers. Other than Rommel’s desert troops it was fought only on water and in the air.